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    <front>
        <journal-meta>
            <journal-id journal-id-type="pmc">Routledge Open Res</journal-id>
            <journal-title-group>
                <journal-title>Routledge Open Research</journal-title>
            </journal-title-group>
            <issn pub-type="epub">2755-1245</issn>
            <publisher>
                <publisher-name>F1000 Research Limited</publisher-name>
                <publisher-loc>London, UK</publisher-loc>
            </publisher>
        </journal-meta>
        <article-meta>
            <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.12688/routledgeopenres.18100.1</article-id>
            <article-categories>
                <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
                    <subject>Essay</subject>
                </subj-group>
                <subj-group>
                    <subject>Articles</subject>
                </subj-group>
            </article-categories>
            <title-group>
                <article-title>
                    <italic>American Strategic Narrative - A Success Story or an Archetypal Rhetoric</italic>
                </article-title>
                <fn-group content-type="pub-status">
                    <fn>
                        <p>[version 1; peer review: 1 approved, 1 approved with reservations]</p>
                    </fn>
                </fn-group>
            </title-group>
            <contrib-group>
                <contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
                    <name>
                        <surname>Bhatti</surname>
                        <given-names>Amjad Mehmood</given-names>
                    </name>
                    <role content-type="http://credit.niso.org/">Conceptualization</role>
                    <role content-type="http://credit.niso.org/">Investigation</role>
                    <role content-type="http://credit.niso.org/">Writing &#x2013; Review &amp; Editing</role>
                    <uri content-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0009-0000-2667-5522</uri>
                    <xref ref-type="corresp" rid="c1">a</xref>
                    <xref ref-type="aff" rid="a1">1</xref>
                </contrib>
                <contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="no">
                    <name>
                        <surname>Mehmood</surname>
                        <given-names>Nasir</given-names>
                    </name>
                    <role content-type="http://credit.niso.org/">Supervision</role>
                    <xref ref-type="aff" rid="a1">1</xref>
                </contrib>
                <aff id="a1">
                    <label>1</label>Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad, 44230, Pakistan</aff>
            </contrib-group>
            <author-notes>
                <corresp id="c1">
                    <label>a</label>
                    <email xlink:href="mailto:machzone@gmail.com">machzone@gmail.com</email>
                </corresp>
                <fn fn-type="conflict">
                    <p>No competing interests were disclosed.</p>
                </fn>
            </author-notes>
            <pub-date pub-type="epub">
                <day>24</day>
                <month>4</month>
            <year>2024</year>
            </pub-date>
            <pub-date pub-type="collection">
            <year>2024</year>
            </pub-date>
         <volume>3</volume>
            <elocation-id>23</elocation-id>
            <history>
                <date date-type="accepted">
                    <day>28</day>
                    <month>2</month>
               <year>2024</year>
                </date>
            </history>
            <permissions>
                <copyright-statement>Copyright: &#x00a9; 2024 Bhatti AM and Mehmood N</copyright-statement>
                <copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
                <license xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
                    <license-p>This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</license-p>
                </license>
            </permissions>
            <self-uri content-type="pdf"
                   xlink:href="https://routledgeopenresearch.org/articles/3-23/pdf"/>
            <abstract>
                <p>Great powers rationalize their position and actions to their people, allies, and opponents. Empirical observations avow the existence of a grand narrative as a fundamental feature in the struggle for supremacy and justification to seize the top position by a great power. The American case is unique; desirous of holding persistent world leadership, it has to constantly adjust its narrative which resonates with the change in time and age shifts. This paper attempts to assess the role of strategic narrative in shaping the US envisaged world order while critically analyzing whether the American strategic narratives have been a success story or just another archetypal rhetoric. While giving an overview of the American narrative from the Monroe Doctrine to the present time, the paper argues that perhaps the American policymakers sometimes overlooked the policy-narrative linkage. Arguably, the American narrative lacked consistency and coherence as it contradicted with actual American foreign policies and created an observable policy-narrative gap. The US's narrative building was characterized by the 'need of time' and it kept mutating from the Cold War to the global war on terror, sometimes entirely contradictory to previously held stances. This paper further highlights that the narratives that the United States adopted during different timeframes were meant to enable the execution of its policy objectives that were set for its path toward world leadership while ensuring that the narratives can gain acceptability as per normative standards and possess enough attraction to be transmitted through various media without catching agonizing criticism.</p>
            </abstract>
            <kwd-group kwd-group-type="author">
                <kwd>American Strategic Narrative</kwd>
                <kwd>Policy-narrative gap</kwd>
                <kwd>Democracy</kwd>
                <kwd>Liberalism</kwd>
            </kwd-group>
            <funding-group>
                <award-group id="fund-1">
                    <funding-source>n/a</funding-source>
                    <award-id>n/a</award-id>
                </award-group>
                <funding-statement>The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting this work.</funding-statement>
            </funding-group>
        </article-meta>
    </front>
    <body>
        <sec sec-type="intro">
            <title>Introduction</title>
            <p>In Superman II, the superhero of the film Superman describes his struggle with Louis Lane as "for truth, justice, and the American way." While a casual viewer may take this as a catchy phrase, nonetheless, if one takes into account the fact that the Superman comics and movies were made during the Cold War years when the ideological scuffle between the American-led Western block and USSR-led Soviet block was at its peak, one can surmise that it is an astute way of projecting the American narrative using the entertainment media
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN2">1</xref>
                </sup>. If one looks at the American narrative of what it holds dear and what value system it represents, one cannot find any better summation of it than how it was delineated in this US theatrical marvel. Why America used a medium such as a film to put forward its narrative and to what end? A simple answer to this question is that states incessantly justify their raison d'etre using as many mediums as are accessible. A state that claims to be a superpower or a global player has to rationalize its position and actions to not only its people but also to its allies as well as opponents or contenders. In the words of Buzan and Waever, "they need to see themselves and be accepted by others in rhetoric and behavior, as having this rank
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN3">2</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;.</p>
            <p>Throughout recorded history, during different times, empires and states who claimed global leadership invariably justified their prestige by carefully crafted narratives, "to establish and maintain influence in the international system and to shape the system itself
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN4">3</xref>
                </sup>." It was also observed by Andreas Antoniades, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O'Loughlin that "strategic narratives are an important tool, which must be considered alongside material resources as a determinant of whether emerging great powers are able to shape a new systemic alignment
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN5">4</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. Numerous empirical examples are available where great powers used both explicit and implicit narratives to attain their objective of world leadership. The Persians claimed to have a divine right to do so due to their racial superiority. &#x201c;By allowing local peoples to continue their traditional social institutions and culture, coupled with the claim that Persian monarchs were chosen to rule by the gods of their conquered colonies, the Persian kings projected, for reasons of propaganda, the image of religious tolerance that they hoped would dampen the desire to revolt among most colonies
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN6">5</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. The Romans viewed themselves as the most civilized nation and hence duty-bound to lead the world. Neville Morley puts it as, &#x201c;&#x2026;.there was also an emphasis on the civilizing mission of the (Roman) Empire, whose divinely-ordained task was to bring peace and impose order for the benefit of all, and to extend the benefits of civilization to the farthest reaches of the world
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN7">6</xref>
                </sup>. The British vindicated their imperialism by the ploy of &#x2018;White man&#x2019;s burden&#x2019; (Rudyard Kipling, in his famous poem &#x201c;
                <italic toggle="yes">The White Man&#x2019;s Burden,</italic>&#x201d; prodded Europeans to take up their moral obligation to civilize the uncivilized) just like the Spaniards, the French, and the Dutch, though only the British prevailed because, along with the narrative, they also had the required resources. Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla argue that &#x201c;in the nineteenth century, the idea of European cultural and moral superiority was at its peak, with a presumed historical mission to civilize the rest of the world by expanding European influence and by colonization
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN8">7</xref>
                </sup>.&#x201d; The Germans under the Nazi rule tried to do the same by using their claim of racial superiority based on Aryan blood, however, could not sustain it due to stronger challengers. Knight Dunlap argues that &#x201c;The German warmongers avidly adopted the myth as a dressing for the doctrine sometimes called &#x2018;Pan-Germanism&#x2019; &#x2013; the doctrine of a race supermen, destined to dominate the world
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN9">8</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. These empirical observations avow the presence of an &#x2018;imperialistic narrative&#x2019; as a fundamental feature in the struggle for supremacy and justification to hold the top position by a particular claimant. The American case is unique in this power struggle and narrative wars. As a contemporary contender and a long-time holder of the top slot, it constantly has to revise its narrative according to the requirements of the age and the nature of the contender.</p>
            <p>This paper aims to provide a critical examination of the American great power narrative, exploring its resonance with the American way of life and worldview, and tracing its evolution from isolationism to active engagement in global affairs. The first section delves into the core values on which the United States of America was founded and highlights its notable contributions to the world in various spheres, even when it was not a significant global player. These include efforts to establish recognition for fundamental human rights and democracy, fostering cultural diversity, promoting education and technological advancements, establishing a free market economy, and playing a leading role in international peace and stability. The subsequent section analyzes the American narrative in greater detail, dividing it into different phases and scrutinizing how the USA framed or reframed its narrative in response to the demands of the time and the nature of its adversaries and challengers.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>Synthesis of American narrative: truth, justice and the American way</title>
            <p>The impetus for crafting narratives comes from core national values and aspirations, which great powers tend to use in their strategic narratives to pursue global leadership. However, the strategic narratives can also act as the &#x201c;tool through which great powers can articulate their interests, values, and aspirations for the international system in ways that offer the opportunity for power transitions
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN10">9</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. Given its liberal and democratic creed, American policies are arguably heavily influenced by the core values and underlying principles of the American way of life. America is governed by identities, values, and paths which helped them to articulate &#x201c;desired plots from the story of political history
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN11">10</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. The identities and values of Americans are the foundational building blocks upon which the United States was built. Americans believe that their core values strengthen their strategic narrative and empower them to propagate their ideology and expand their influence on a global scale. These fundamental values and principles are deeply ingrained in the American way of life and include Equality, Individualism, and Informality, as well as the belief that "what's done is done" and that history starts today. Time is viewed as money, and materialism is closely linked to the Protestant work ethic. The American strategic narrative is fortified when it strives for equality and justice in global affairs, prioritizes transparency in international relations, prioritizes cooperation over competition, and asserts its leadership in technological innovation. Upholding these fundamental values provides a sturdy foundation for communicating America's message and engendering support both domestically and internationally.</p>
            <p>To achieve world leadership, a great power must demonstrate tangible contributions to global civilization and a compelling rationale for being an exemplary nation as a global powerhouse. While staying true to its core values, America has made significant contributions to world affairs. One of the most notable contributions is the endowment of fundamental rights, such as liberty, freedom, and revolution, by declaring independence from monarchs and feudal lords more than a decade before the French Revolution in 1789. However, it cannot be ignored that in later history, the US has also invaded many nations and brutally suppressed the fundamental rights of citizens. Another significant contribution is the introduction of federalism and democratic governance. Americans not only take pride in it but also consider it essential for the entire world. Additionally, America is often referred to as a "melting pot" and a land of opportunity, providing employment opportunities and embracing cultural and religious diversity. Hector St John de Cr&#x00e8;vecoeur wrote in 1782, &#x201c;In America, individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN12">11</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. Despite adopting a capitalist model, the USA has a rich tradition of charitable giving for various causes. One example of this is the Marshall Plan, which was one of the largest financial aid programs in recent history, providing aid for the rebuilding of war-torn Europe after World War II. Additionally, USAID is one of the largest official aid agencies, administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. However, this generosity has at times been accompanied by economic coercion, serving American interests. David Wall, in his book "The Charity of Nations: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid," pessimistically concludes that the prime motive for US aid has been self-interest. Moreover, America has also made significant contributions to public schooling, science, and technology, benefiting not only American society but humanity as a whole. The emergence of the free market has been a dominant economic trend in modern times, with America serving as a torchbearer of the virtues of a free-market economy and profiteering. With many global financial institutions based in the USA and heavily dependent on American contributions for their functioning, the USA has rightfully claimed leadership of the capitalist world. However, this system has been criticized for causing alienation, exploitation, and massive economic inequality.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>The narrative for American path to the status of world leader</title>
            <p>Nicholas Cull argued that &#x201c;the United States was born from a surge of ideas and a war that demonstrated the power of propaganda to rally men and women to those ideas&#x2026;. with the battle won, ideological projection remained high on the agenda of the new republic. New and radical governments have always needed to explain their politics to the world"
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN13">12</xref>
                </sup>. American values and contributions to the world have formed the basis for narrative building in the USA's aspiration to be a righteous leader in the global community. In order to substantiate their value-based leadership claims, Americans have propagated a number of narratives, including "Manifest Destiny," "Truth, Justice, American Way," "Protection of Freedom," "Non-interference," "Spread of Democracy," "Menace of Communism," "Moral Responsibility to Resolve Global Problems," "Leader of the Free World," "Uphold Free Will, Economic Choice, and Religious Liberty," "War Against Terrorism and Axis of Evil," "Protection of Rules-Based Order," and "Abuse of Human Rights," among others.</p>
            <p>Despite its enormous size and comparative might, the US was reluctant to play a significant role beyond its immediate neighborhood for the first one and a half centuries of its existence. It considered the two oceans as a natural barrier between itself and the old world. The first US president, George Washington, declared in his farewell address, &#x201c;It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN14">13</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. When examining the American ascent to global power and the narrative it espoused, it's possible to identify two distinct phases. The first phase, stretching from the Monroe Doctrine to the early years of World War II, saw the US adopt a somewhat hesitant approach to global affairs. The second phase commenced with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent Allied victory over Germany and Japan. The hallmark of the second phase is the Cold War, during which the United States not only positioned itself as the leader of the free world but also offered a counter-narrative to the socialist stance and policies on international politics advanced by the former USSR. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union engaged in a policy of proxy warfare and narrative competition in order to defeat each other. In the post-Cold War era, the US became the world's sole superpower and began to project itself as morally and ethically responsible for solving global issues. This approach was exemplified by events such as Bush Senior's Gulf War, Clinton's Camp David diplomacy, and the Bosnian War. Following the September 11 attacks, the US once again positioned itself as a moral force that was under threat by "evil" forces, such as Al-Qaida and the so-called "axis of evil" states (Iraq, Libya, and North Korea), which sought to undermine the established rules-based global order.</p>
            <p>In this section, we will provide a brief overview of the American narrative from the Monroe Doctrine to the present day, examining its foundational points and exploring how it is linked to American core values and contributions discussed in the previous section.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>Monroe Doctrine</title>
            <p>Between 1783 and 1853, the United States expanded its territory and focused on purging the colonial powers from western hemisphere. The vivid manifestation of this resolve was manifested by American President James Monroe in 1823, when he argued that the New World and the Old World were two different and separate spheres of influence and that European powers should stay out of the region. This was a defining moment in American history, as it marked a particular territory beyond its geographical confines as an area of interest and influence in which it would not accept any outside interference. In retrospect, many observers consider it a crucial juncture in the American narrative of foreign policy and a sign of the arrival of a more assertive USA on the world stage. Renehan Jr. puts it as &#x201c;Monroe&#x2019;s words enunciated a narrative for establishing the American sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere that exists to the present day, and that has shaped the foreign policies of every president
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN15">14</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. This may be true; however, the emergence of the United States as a global power on the world stage was still more than a century away. At that time, most of the European powers did not pay much attention to it and dismissed the narrative.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>American narrative for expansion</title>
            <p>The American desire for expansion was propagated through the narrative of &#x201c;Manifest Destiny,&#x201d; which embodied the expressions of American exceptionalism and romantic nationalism. Influential Americans promoted this narrative to expand popular American morality and "extend the area of freedom." It also epitomized the conflation of America's potential greatness, the nation's budding sense of romantic self-identity, and its expansionism. Its manifestation came through massive annexations such as the Louisiana Purchase,
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN16">15</xref>
                </sup> as well as the use of force to seize Cuba. In 1892, the Republican Party realigned with the expansion narrative and proclaimed, "We reaffirm our approval of the Monroe doctrine and believe in the achievement of the manifest destiny of the Republic in its broadest sense
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN17">16</xref>
                </sup>." Finally, in 1898, following the destruction of the American battleship USS Maine in Havana Harbor in an unknown attack, Americans reactivated the narrative blaming the Spanish military occupying Cuba for the attack. Consequently, the USA targeted Cuba to expel Spain from the Pacific and the Caribbean. American newspapers ran sensationalist stories depicting atrocities and the displacement of thousands of Cubans by Spanish occupation forces, in support of the war narrative. After a short war, Spain accepted defeat and agreed to leave Cuba, ceding the Caribbean and the Pacific to the USA. This resulted in America also annexing the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. In the same year, the USA occupied Hawaii. Arguably, it was through the narrative of &#x201c;Manifest Destiny&#x201d; that the USA became a colonial power. Many influential Americans influenced public opinion and instilled the belief of America's destined expansion in the minds of the people through their speeches and writings.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>World War I</title>
            <p>Despite pursuing the narrative of &#x2018;Manifest Destiny&#x2019; to extend its influence in world politics, the USA perhaps made no further attempt to consolidate its position as Presidents Taft and Wilson decided not to expand and followed an isolationist policy. In fact, President Wilson decided not to involve the country in the First World War, so much so that he ran for the presidential election on the slogan &#x201c;he kept us out of war&#x201d; in 1916. However, A Scott Berg argues that &#x201c;a significant group of Americans believed deeply in the Allied cause from the war&#x2019;s very first days. They saw Belgium as an innocent victim of German aggression, and France and Britain as defenders of a democratic way of life and international order that Imperial Germany was trying to destroy
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN18">17</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. Hence, through the narrative of protecting democratic ideology, public opinion was swayed and "tens of thousands of Americans joined the Allied armies or volunteered to serve the Allies as nurses, doctors, and aid workers
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN19">18</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;.</p>
            <p> With an underlying sense of prestige, superior values, and democratic ideology, Americans began to build a narrative dominated by the belief that &#x201c;Central Powers were a threat not just to British and French values, but to American ones as well. It was further strengthened through the propagation of accounts of German atrocities in Belgium, the sinking of the Lusitania, and the massacre of the Armenians
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN20">19</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;, which Americans pronounced not acceptable to them. The American narrative intensified in 1917 when the German Navy sank American ships in the Atlantic. Another contributing event was the intercepted Zimmerman telegram (a secret diplomatic communication issued from Germany to Mexico) which revealed that Germany was attempting to make an alliance with Mexico against the USA. President Wilson, taking the stance that &#x201c;it is America's responsibility to make the world safe for democracy,&#x201d; joined the war effort in April 1917. This narrative gave Wilson a leading role in post-war negotiations to reshape the international order, and he proposed a League of Nations for peaceful diplomacy and collective security. Although the world responded positively, Wilson could not convince the American Congress, which was still dominated by isolationists, to join the League as a member. Due to economic concerns that culminated in the Great Depression, the USA withdrew from the global economy and followed a protectionist economic policy. The window for a global role for the USA, if it ever existed, was now closed as the country turned inward.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>World War II</title>
            <p>During the interwar period, America aspired to expand its economy to later use it for a more influential role in world politics. Therefore, it favored the policy of isolationism and non-entanglement from troubling events, especially in Europe, which they thought could serve the purpose of recuperating from the Great Depression. This policy got substantial support as the &#x201c;American public was disillusioned by the fact that America could not create a great impact at the international arena despite the loss of thousands of American lives and believed that getting so deeply involved on the global stage in 1917 had been a mistake
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN21">20</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. It was further strengthened by the narrative of the 'invulnerability of America&#x2019; by the &#x201c;free security&#x201d; that had been provided to the United States by the expanse of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans which allowed it detachment from Old World conflicts. The underlying objective of this anti-imperialist narrative was also to enhance the prestige of the United States by adopting the good neighbor policy. Despite following this narrative, America knew that it could quickly convert its economic resources into the hard military capability necessary to protect its interests in Latin America and elsewhere.</p>
            <p>However, with the developments during WWII, the United States realized the need to protect its interests in Asia and Europe and play an active role in world conflicts, especially in the wake of Germany and Japan seizing power and trade routes, and trouncing democratic ideology and western values. To achieve this, a change in the narrative was required, which became apparent as Roosevelt condemned Japan&#x2019;s conquests in Asia and openly stated that &#x201c;it might be desirable for peace-loving nations to &#x201c;quarantine&#x201d; aggressor nations
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN22">21</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. While anticipating a possible military role, Roosevelt concentrated on regional security agreements and continued to build up the naval fleet. The new narrative was able to sway public opinion away from favoring neutrality to supporting European Allies with military hardware and economic aid, but it was still inadequate to garner support for tangible American involvement in the war. The shocking Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, killing almost 2500 personnel and destroying large military equipment on the base and harbor including the airplanes and battleships served as nothing less than a perfect catalyst to convince the majority of Americans for entering the war. The next day, the USA declared war on Japan, followed by Germany. In a collective effort, England, the USSR, and the USA jointly fought Germany and its allies. The USSR was a reluctant ally and soon emerged as a contender and challenger to the Western camp after the defeat of Germany. Due to heavy economic losses, England was not in a position to play a leadership role and the loss of its colonies around the world further diminished its influence. As Paul Kennedy puts it, &#x201c;The blunt fact was that in securing a victorious outcome to the war, the British had severely overstrained themselves, running down their gold and dollar reserves, wearing out their domestic machinery, and becoming increasingly dependent upon American...
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN23">22</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;</p>
            <p>The United States of America was the only country to emerge from World War II with a strong economy and military force. At this point, American leadership was not only willing to shed its isolationist policy, but also eager to play a leading role in upholding the values of democracy and a capitalist economy. The obvious means of pursuing this desire was a narrative of global leadership, which emerged as the US sought to "bring democracy and freedom to the world." Two developments played a crucial role in this shift: the USSR's control of Berlin and its refusal to withdraw from its positions, and the American decision to drop atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The USSR had a distinct political and economic system that directly clashed with the Western model. Stalin's actions made it clear to Western countries, particularly England and the USA, that he intended to capitalize on Soviet gains during the war and promote socialist movements worldwide, particularly in Europe. This was unacceptable to the West, and marked a new beginning for the United States. Not only did it decide to counter the Soviet threat with full force, but its narrative also transformed from one of isolationism to a moral obligation to uphold democratic ideology and Western values. Likewise, being the only country in possession of the atomic weapons gave the USA a monopoly on the ultimate weapon of destruction, enabling it to wield a threat against any world power and assert its dominance. The US felt it had earned the right to hold the top position of power and deserved to control world affairs.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>The Cold War</title>
            <p> 	The Cold War is considered unique by historians and strategists for several reasons. However, this section does not aim to provide a detailed historical account of the events that took place during the Cold War, as they are well-documented and beyond the scope of this study. Instead, this section aims to highlight how the American narrative positioned itself and its main rival, the USSR, in a distinct manner, and to explain the how and why of this conflict. The first aggressive narrative against the USSR was built through Truman's Doctrine of Communist Containment. This doctrine positioned the US as the defender of a free world, providing legitimacy for American activism during the Cold War. In his March 1947 speech, Truman stated, "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."</p>
            <p>For well-known reasons, the Americans and Soviets avoided direct military confrontation during the Cold War, but came dangerously close to it several times. The American narrative during the cold war framed competition and conflict with the USSR as a &#x2018;struggle for freedom&#x2019; and to &#x2018;uphold free will, economic choice, and religious liberty&#x2019;. The Soviet Union was projected as amoral, areligious, and atheist devoid of any moral and social values where people were enslaved against their will. Communism was framed as evil and wrong and totalitarian. President Regan on March 12, 1987 remarked at the Brandenburg Gate, &#x201c;Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic South, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same -- still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state&#x201d;. Throughout the Cold War, a moralistic justification was always found for American actions. For example, American financial support for Europe under the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, and the Vietnam War were all portrayed by the Americans as necessary steps for the greater good. Meanwhile, the USSR was depicted as expansionist, denying smaller and weaker states their right to liberty and independence. The Soviet army was often portrayed as a red bear. Below are some examples of how Americans projected the Soviets and the USSR, and how countering them was framed as a moral duty for every human being.</p>
            <p>The Cold War persisted until 1991, during which the USA and USSR signed several trade, arms control, and other international agreements, and experienced both hostile and peaceful phases. However, both sides continued to support proxies and third parties against each other. While the Soviets supported the Vietcong resistance against American forces, the Americans provided support to the Afghan resistance against Soviet forces. Although there were multiple reasons for the USSR's collapse in 1991, the United States quickly claimed victory and the end of ideological-driven conflicts.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>Role of the US Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War</title>
            <p>The Americans framed the Cold War in a unique manner, relying heavily on mass and electronic media (see 
                <xref ref-type="fig" rid="f1">Figure 1</xref>). According to Cull's analysis, "multiple efforts of the Roosevelt administration in the field of propaganda meant that the United States joined the Second World War without a coherent structure.
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN24">23</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d; To address this inadequacy, the US news and information apparatus needed to be amalgamated. In June 1942, Roosevelt created the Office of War Information (OWI), which was intended to serve war policy and, to some extent, foreign policy through various publications and international newspapers. After end of WWII, President Truman combined the OWI with existing programs in public information, cultural diplomacy, and educational exchanges to form the Interim International Information Service (IIIS). To some observers, it was viewed as an effort to sell the Truman Doctrine and project the Marshall Plan
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN25">24</xref>
                </sup>". Later, in August 1953, Eisenhower established the US Information Agency (USIA), also known as the US Information Services (USIS), with the purpose of strengthening American ideology and propagating the narrative both domestically and internationally. Its aim was to "tell America's story to the world" and engage the world through international information, broadcasting, culture, and exchange programs
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN26">25</xref>
                </sup>. USIA developed close relationships with Hollywood, TV, and broadcast media, such as the Voice of America (VOA).</p>
            <fig fig-type="figure" id="f1" orientation="portrait" position="float">
                <label>Figure 1. </label>
                <caption>
                    <title>Role of Media in Propagation of the US Narrative.</title>
                    <p>From left to right: Image released by the US Information Agency 1953, American anti-communist comic book published in 1950, Comics published in 1960 by The Catholic Catechetical Guild of Minneapolis, Comics used as military propaganda at various media and legend is missing. </p>
                </caption>
                <graphic orientation="portrait" position="float"
                     xlink:href="https://routledgeopenresearch-files.f1000.com/manuscripts/19389/f562d0fa-73f0-47c8-b5f2-cca96d9e3b80_figure1.gif"/>
            </fig>
            <p>USIA's first significant activity was the propagation of Eisenhower's campaign of "Atoms for Peace", which aimed to establish the US's nuclear deterrence. To curtail the spread of communism, the USIA launched its "People's Capitalism campaign" by projecting key indicators of American prosperity through various media channels
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN27">26</xref>
                </sup>. In Europe, the USIA promoted European integration and worked to establish the US's influence. One such effort was the film "Tom Schuler: Cobbler Statesman" made on the theme of the advantages of removing trade and political barriers. To curb the influence of the Communist Party, USIA aided the "free trade unions" in Italy and projected the Austrian treaty in 1955. In South America, it challenged the Soviet monopoly on labor politics by propagating the theme of "partners in progress" and free trade unions through various films and journals. The USIA promoted the US's intervention in Guatemala to overthrow the communist government by portraying its misdeeds. However, the instability that followed caused 200,000 deaths in political violence in Guatemala. The USIA played a key role in the Suez crisis in 1956 to enhance US standing in the Middle East and diminish the influence of Britain and France in the region through additional coverage by the VOA. In Asia, the USIA focused on containing China by projecting stories of Chinese human rights violations.</p>
            <p>The primary objective of USIA was to target the Soviet Union. The United States saw large-scale cultural exchanges with Russia as an opportunity to reach out to the Soviet public. To achieve this goal, USIA offered unrestricted access to America to the Soviets in exchange for the same, but these cultural exchanges could not alleviate the tension of the Cold War. During the Berlin Crisis of 1958, USIA's propaganda campaign worldwide strengthened the American narrative through various mediums such as broadcasts, publications, and documentaries like "Simply Berlin." The events that followed the Soviets' shooting down of the American spy plane U-2 highlighted some flaws in USIA's narrative-building, but the agency managed to minimize the damage. USIA faced a daunting task of proactively communicating a clear American position to the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis. The agency's efforts included broadcasting President Kennedy's speech and transmitting U-2 photographs worldwide to show the missile sites in Cuba. For the Vietnam cause, the USIA had to project American commitment to South Vietnam and Kennedy believed that "Now we have a problem of making our power credible, and Vietnam is the place.
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN28">27</xref>
                </sup>" The USIA worked to engage the Vietnam war's critics by confronting the international media who reported against the American narrative. The USIA helped to build the narrative for Nixon and Kissinger's efforts at an international level to extricate honorably from South Vietnam. Other than Vietnam War, USSR's success in the space race became a weakness for the American global image. USIA trumpeted NASA's Gemini program in 196,6 while coverage of Apollo XI&#x2019;s landing on the moon in 1969 was the undoubtedly high point of USIA. Worldwide coverage and projection of Apollo XI boosted the global standing of the United States.</p>
            <p>In 1978, the USIA was reorganized as the International Communication Agency (ICA), while still providing support for foreign policy. Its initial focus was on cultural exchanges with China. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the agency launched a rather delayed public diplomacy effort in Iran, beginning with the VOA Farsi service. During the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, ICA stepped in to "make special efforts to underscore the atheistic and anti-Islamic nature of the Soviet and Afghan governments." It also aided the mujahideen through grants and media training such as Afghan Media Resource Center (AMRC) in Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1982, ICA was assigned a new task of promoting democracy globally, which involved providing grants to aid anti-Communist political institutions, labor unions, and newspapers in the Third World
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN29">28</xref>
                </sup>. USIA continued to play a significant role in the fall of the USSR and the triumph of the US narrative in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Finally, on September 30, 1999, the USIA was shut down, and its functions were mostly transferred to the newly created &#x2018;Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs&#x2019;.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>America&#x2019;s unipolar moment: America during the 1990s</title>
            <p>During the post-Cold War era, the United States had to reshape its strategic narrative to project itself as a moral global leader responsible for ensuring peace and order in the world. President Bush proclaimed the vision of a "new world order" built on new ways of working with other nations, with a focus on peaceful dispute resolution, solidarity against aggression, controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN30">29</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. This was soon followed by an American-led military alliance that fought forces on behalf of Saudi Arabia along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border. The United States then liberated Kuwait and imposed no-fly zones on Iraq to support the Kurdish freedom struggle. According to this narrative, the United States once again demonstrated its responsibility as a moral leader by using NATO forces to halt ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia after the UN failed to authorize military action. President Clinton also attempted to resolve the long-standing Palestinian-Israeli conflict through diplomacy, which resulted in several rounds of dialogue and a few positive developments, including a peace accord. The United States also urged its allies and partners to seek peaceful resolutions to ethnopolitical conflicts in places such as Rwanda. Throughout the 1990s, the United States framed its narrative on moralistic values, portraying itself as the world leader willing to take necessary measures to ensure freedom from oppression and tyranny.</p>
            <p>The American drive for a unipolar world order had to be supported by a strong strategic narrative. Fortunately for America, the 1990s and 2000s coincided with a boom in information technology (IT), from which America benefited the most as the hub of the technology revolution at that time. America aimed to ensure a favorable media ecology, which it achieved through massive investments in developing and regulating information infrastructure, including electronic, print, and digital media. Arguably, America found it convenient to trumpet Internet freedom loudly, given its ability to intrigue the internet, which coincided with its ideology of liberal and democratic ways. The US consistently criticized regimes such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia for restricting the internet, and refuted them by pushing anti-blocking software and funding various NGOs. America systematically harnessed technology to steer the emerging media ecology towards legitimacy for its intervention in various parts of the world, albeit in a challenging environment. Huge amounts of user-generated images and other content during various conflicts, such as the Gulf Wars, 9/11, Kosovo War, Arab Springs, etc., were used to add authenticity to its narratives. The prime focus of this endeavor was the projection of authoritative voices through leadership speeches carrying policy cardinals and narrative themes. This was evident in Obama&#x2019;s Cairo speech, which was supported by extensive use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and live online streaming. Through such media ecology, Obama not only identified US-Islamic relations but also spelled foreign policy "red lines&#x201d;
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN31">30</xref>
                </sup>. Social media was systematically used to project narrative themes through several stories, while scientifically pitching them to audiences. Whether it was CNN, the mushrooming of electronic media, the flooding of the internet, or public diplomacy, the US committed itself to the war of Strategic Narratives, with several actors involved in a given conflict. The US faced a challenging media environment due to the ingress of alternative actors, including Al Jazeera, which contested with differing narratives and exploited US brutalities during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, utilizing media ecology. Nevertheless, America utilized the rapid developments and disruptive technologies of communication smartly to shape the patterns of information flow, readjust the authority and legitimacy, and ultimately gain power during the reshaping of the world order.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>The war against terror and the axis of evil</title>
            <p>The 9/11 attacks ushered in a new era in American global engagement, and once again, the narrative required readjustment and reframing. Although the problem was not new, and Americans were not unaware of its existence, 9/11 presented a new challenge to American hegemony. This was an important event, not only for the United States of America, which was the primary target of Osama bin Laden-led Al-Qaida, but also for the world at large. For the first time, a violent non-state actor was able to militarily challenge a state actor, especially the most powerful state. America once again projected its struggle against terrorists as a struggle against good and evil. It projected itself as a force of good and virtue that was struggling against the forces of darkness and evil that wanted to drag the world back to orthodoxy. The United States aimed to portray terrorism as a threat to the free world, emphasizing that agents of evil sought to deny people their right to free will and choice. This narrative bore similarities to the American rhetoric used against the USSR during the Cold War. In addition to the terror threat, President Bush identified Libya, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil" that needed to be countered. The very title assigned to these three states suggests that the narrative was framed within a good-versus-bad and good-versus-evil framework.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>American narrative to curtail the Chinese power and maintain status quo</title>
            <p>The American dream of retaining global leadership seems to be challenged by a growing giant, China. According to Graham Allison, Nathalie Kiersznowski, and Charlotte Fitzek's research, "China is redefining the global economic order by sustaining economic growth at an average rate four times that of the US for the past four decades. Its GDP has soared from $1.2 trillion to $17.7 trillion since 2000, making it likely to overtake the US within a decade. China has displaced the US as the manufacturing workshop of the world and become the number one trading partner of most nations, while also establishing itself as the most crucial link in critical global supply chains. Additionally, China is home to the largest number of the most valuable global companies, rivals the US in attracting foreign investment, and has reached parity with the US in gross R&amp;D investments"
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN32">31</xref>
                </sup>. America perceives China's economic rise as a precursor to its military might, ultimately challenging its status as a global leader. As a result, America supports an antagonistic policy backed by a 'China threat' narrative to curtail this rise. The American narrative has focused on blaming China for adopting &#x2018;coercive diplomacy&#x2019; and &#x2018;economic coercion&#x2019; against other countries in East Asia, including South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. These actions have created obstacles to US regional cooperation in the area. During a speech at George Washington University on May 26, 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused China of undermining the laws, agreements, principles, and institutions that have enabled its success and benefit other countries. He further stated that the US will defend and strengthen international law, agreements, principles, and institutions that promote peace and security and protect the rights of individuals and sovereign nations
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN33">32</xref>
                </sup>.&#x201d;</p>
            <p>In an effort to legitimize its policies against China and Russia, America heavily relies on the narrative of &#x201c;democracy versus authoritarianism&#x201d;. This narrative portrays China and Russia as authoritarian states that intend to restrict democratic values and control both their own citizens and the world. National Security Advisor Robert O&#x2019;Brien has commented that "China is using technology to control its own citizens and spy on other nations ... the divide between the democratic world and the authoritarian world will largely be reflected by who chooses to use Chinese 5G
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN34">33</xref>
                </sup>." This narrative is further strengthened by American promotion of existing alliances and the formation of a broader alliance of democracies. Americans insist that their condemnation of human rights violations supports efforts for peace, security, and human dignity, but this explicitly targets China on the pretext of human rights. However, American policies in places such as Rwanda, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan have provided ample room for criticism of its philanthropic narrative. As a result, the American narrative has lost significant ground, as China has been able to illustrate major achievements in improving the quality of human life, meeting the UN 2030 Agenda for poverty reduction, and establishing the world's largest social security system. Another blow to the American narrative comes from its failure to ensure people's safety within its own borders. The Chinese government alleges that "America is the country with the most rampant gun violence, where shootings claim over 110 lives on average each day. Despite its claims of championing equality, white supremacy continues to cause havoc in the US, fueling hate crimes against Asian Americans, ongoing racial persecution of Indigenous peoples, and discrimination against Muslims." In debunking the American narrative of global leadership in human rights, China accuses the US of "attacking and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in the name of human rights. Since 2001, the US has waged wars or conducted military operations in about 80 countries under the guise of the war on terror, resulting in the deaths of more than 900,000 people, including 300,000 civilians
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN35">34</xref>
                </sup>.</p>
            <p>The US seems to have realized that the rapid shift towards multipolarity and regionalism can be countered by strengthening its geopolitical presence in Asia and Africa, backed by a compelling narrative. The US narrative has shifted towards promoting regional peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, as reflected in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and the need for a free and open Indo-Pacific to foster people's prosperity. However, this narrative of prosperity is seen by China mainly as a harbinger of conflict and rivalry. China accuses the US of "co-opting with allies to forge a five-four-three-two-one formation made up of the Five Eyes, the Quad, AUKUS, bilateral alliances, and IPEF, forming exclusive small circles, and forcing countries in the region to take sides. These are attempts to materialize an Asia-Pacific version of NATO and promote integrated deterrence against China
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN36">35</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;.</p>
            <p>Another widely propagated American narrative blames China for being a major contributor to spreading emissions causing climate change and environmental degradation. However, this narrative fails to account for "unconstrained emissions over more than two centuries of industrialization. From 1850 to 2011, developed countries led by the US contributed to 79 percent of global carbon emissions." The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement have all demanded that developed countries, not China, repay their historical debts
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN37">36</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec>
            <title>Analysis of American strategic narrative</title>
            <p>American leaders, for generations, have promoted the democratic way of life while keeping the core American values and democratic ideology at the forefront. In the 1960s, Kennedy embarked on fostering democracy in the developing world as a noble service to humanity. Later, Reagan renewed this campaign by casting his fervent anti-Soviet agenda as a democracy crusade. Both Bush and Clinton reaffirmed the promotion of democratic ideology as a key US narrative to assert the influence of the United States in the 1990s. However, the obvious observation in the American strategic narrative, that any critic can highlight, is the lack of consistency and coherence. The narrative that the US emphasized the most, especially post-Cold War, was built around the virtues of democracy and preservation of human rights. Whether it was meant to win liberation from authoritarian suppression or to spread American ideology and influence in the world, perhaps it could not agree well with actual American policies in different parts of the world. On one hand, America had reasons to celebrate this narrative on account of prosperity and development achieved by the countries that embraced the democratic system such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and South Korea. On the other hand, the stubborn fact remained that the US maintained cooperative security relations with a wide range of authoritarian governments. Thomas Carothers argues that "Countervailing interests, both security-related and economic, have often outweighed or undermined a US interest in democracy. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States has maintained friendly relations with dictatorships and intervened in the internal affairs of other countries for purposes far removed from the promotion of democracy. Prodemocracy rhetoric has regularly exceeded reality and has sometimes been used deliberately to obscure a contrary reality
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN38">37</xref>
                </sup>.&#x201d; The open intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of many countries represents a clear divergence from its narrative and impairs the promotion of democracy. The American narrative has suffered several setbacks and criticisms due to divergent political interests in the Middle East and the ambition to curb Chinese rise, leading to policy changes and alliances. In many countries, including Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Egypt, Armenia, Azerbaijan, among others, the US relaxed its stance on the narrative of democracy and prioritized friendly ties to secure interests such as trade and oil. Such choices have done little to enhance the credibility of the narrative, while inducing policy dilemmas and rifts with various governments over their political shortcomings. This narrative-policy gap, as per Thomas Carothers, created a perception that &#x201c;the US only pushes for democracy against its adversaries or in strategically irrelevant countries
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN39">38</xref>
                </sup>." Carothers argues further that the US concern for democracy and human rights in various partner countries mostly remained lip service, which demonstrates that the US political interests outweigh democracy and liberalism. For example, in Egypt, the US has concerns over authoritarian politics, yet it maintains strong security cooperation. Similarly, the Indo-US strategic partnership is thriving despite human rights violations in Kashmir and growing religious intolerance in India.</p>
            <p>The American narrative-policy gap is evident in the inconsistent strategies used to promote democracy, which have alternated between top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach aims to encourage regimes to adopt democratic and liberal political ideologies and governance systems. However, this approach has caused significant upheaval in international politics and the security environment, as it has involved both direct and indirect military interventions in various countries, including Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan. Despite the widespread narrative of bringing peace and stability through a democratic system, the top-down strategy has instead created instability and human rights crises in many regions, resulting in substantial costs for the US itself. On the other hand, the US attempted to initiate democratic transitions in several authoritarian states using a bottom-up approach. This involved funding political parties, investing in civil society, and promoting liberal values and feminism
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN40">39</xref>
                </sup>. However, this approach was considered ineffective, sluggish, and ethnocentric, as it was perceived as interference in the internal affairs of these states. The inconsistency of these strategies can be seen as a factor in discrediting the US narrative and generating resentment towards its policies.</p>
            <p>An analysis of the US narrative would be incomplete if the role played by the USIA in propagating the narrative is ignored. According to Cull's assessment, the agency's focus was on five core elements of public diplomacy: listening, advocacy, culture, exchange, and international broadcasting
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN41">40</xref>
                </sup>. The USIA ingeniously developed its network of listening mechanisms to evaluate the international mood. During the Cold War, the agency was employed as a short-term policy communication apparatus through various media, ambassadors, and the agency's office of Policy and Plans. However, propagating the US policy dented the agency's credibility in international broadcasting, exchange, and cultural work. Although the agency's cultural drive experienced highs and lows, the worldwide ingress of American culture and the popularity of Hollywood verify the success of its cultural diplomacy initiatives. The US realized that exchange programs could be the most effective tool of public diplomacy and based it on a people-to-people activity, facilitated by the government and executed through various universities, military departments, and organizations such as Institute for International Education (IREX) and Meridian House.</p>
            <p>Arguably, the sole objective of exchange diplomacy was "the anticipation that American ideology might prevail, and exchanges were treated as just another way to convince other nations of the superiority of the American way
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN42">41</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. Key initiatives of the USIA attracted thousands of rising stars and hundreds of heads of states in a matter of a few years, which served the objective adequately. The Voice of America and the CIA's sponsored "Radio Free Europe" were the key propaganda tools used to spread the American narrative. While struggling to present balanced stories, the two systems mainly worked to present the policies of the US government to the world. Arguably, the USIA was the apparatus needed to propagate the US narrative and policy. In the East, it remained instrumental in waging the Cold War against the Soviet Union, China, and their satellites. In the West, it was employed to sustain and develop relationships within the Western alliance, while in the South, it did not hold back from reaching out to the developing world
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN43">42</xref>
                </sup>. Despite all these achievements, the fact remains that narrative building through public diplomacy cannot exist in a vacuum. The USIA had to serve the US narrative despite there being a dearth of substance and regular state policy. This was particularly evident in the Vietnam War when the narrative and public diplomacy could not rescue a flawed policy. Historical events hint that the US's narrative building was characterized by the "need of time" and kept mutating from the Cold War to the global war on terror, sometimes entirely contradictory to previously held stances. The USIA was struck by the daunting task of making the US ideology and policies appear good for the world. The agency had to preserve its credibility, and despite its efforts to push the US narrative by giving a spin to reality, it could not afford to present a total fiction. However, in the longer term, its efforts successfully contributed to fundamental changes in attitude in many regions.</p>
            <p>American liberal ideology has its roots in the ideas of President Woodrow Wilson, who articulated a set of initial liberal thoughts. According to Kissinger's views, Wilson&#x2019;s vision comprised thoughts that formed part of the US narrative throughout the twentieth century, which endorsed the foundation for a peaceful world requiring states to embrace liberal ideology. Under this narrative, US-led efforts for establishing international law and legal institutions resulted in creating many international tribunals, as well as a permanent International Criminal Court. Moreover, American liberal ideology also reinvigorated many human rights institutions. However, despite maintaining a liberal ideological narrative, in practice, the US pursued a stubbornly realist approach, and Eric Posner views it as &#x201c;in practice, American idealism rejected the Westphalian international system, in which states are forbidden to intervene in others' internal affairs and peace results from maintaining a balance of power
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN44">43</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. All American presidents repeatedly emphasized protecting &#x2018;America's vital national interest&#x2019; in various parts of the world. Biden put it as &#x201c;we had no vital interest in Afghanistan other than to prevent an attack on America&#x2019;s homeland and our friends
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN45">44</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. Arguably, despite being a champion of liberal values and trumpeting its narrative, America never had a real interest in introducing liberal values in Afghanistan or making efforts to avert the looming civil war after its chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Realistic motives in American liberal rhetoric could be found in its post-cold war policies. According to Eric's arguments, America advanced a very ambitious realism, whereby it mandated that all states must adopt American ideology and institutions.
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN46">45</xref>
                </sup>. It can also be observed that throughout its history, the United States has made various policy choices based purely on a realist perspective, such as its power politics, nuclear doctrine, and economic competition with China, despite promoting narratives of liberal ideology. Similarly, despite promoting institutionalism as the theme of its strategic narrative, the US has exploited those very international institutions for furthering its political interests.</p>
            <p>The US public narrative asserts that the US does not seek a new Cold War with China and denies any intention to curtail Chinese power. However, this is an example of the narrative-policy gap as US policy continues to aim at curbing and suppressing China. This can be seen in the US's imposition of sanctions on Chinese companies and the implementation of export control measures to restrict China's access to biotechnology and artificial intelligence technologies. Additionally, American geopolitics aimed at reducing Chinese and Russian power in different regions of the world deviates from this narrative.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec sec-type="conclusions">
            <title>Conclusion</title>
            <p>Strategic narratives are essential for nations to pursue a path toward global leadership, as &#x201c;they serve as representations of a sequence of events and identities, and a communicative tool through which political elites attempt to give determined meaning to past, present, and future to achieve political objectives
                <sup>
                    <xref ref-type="other" rid="FN47">46</xref>
                </sup>&#x201d;. The American narrative indicates that once America decided to get out of its isolationist mode and actively participate in global affairs and take the helm of affairs, the justification that it developed was framed within its core values of truth, justice, capitalist economic model, and freedom of choice and religion. While this paper is not aimed at critically examining whether this claim was honest or not, it would suffice to say that the United States of America always frames its narrative with a moralistic justification that resonates with a broad audience, regardless of their race, religion, or creed. Striving for good and shunning evil is something that is accepted across different religious and non-religious communities alike. The same is true for freedom of choice and free economic activity. Very few people in the world would voluntarily withdraw from these rights. Hence, one could argue that one of the reasons the United States has held the top slot is that its narrative, "America holding world leadership is the best option for safeguarding the interests of global citizens," resonates with people across regional and continental divides. In the intervening years, several contenders have emerged, but all have disappeared without dethroning the US. China is the contemporary contender. Whether it can do what no one has been able to do thus far would not only require a strong social, economic, and geopolitical alternative to the American model, but also a compelling narrative justifying why it should be at the top slot instead of the USA.</p>
        </sec>
    </body>
    <back>
        <sec sec-type="data-availability">
            <title>Data availability</title>
            <p>No data are associated with this article.</p>
        </sec>
        <fn-group>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN2">
                    <sup>1</sup> Steven Mintz, Randy Roberts, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Hollywood&#x2019;s America</italic>, (Philadelphia: Brandywine Press, 1994), 26.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN3">
                    <sup>2</sup> Buzan, Ole W&#x00e6;ver, Regions and Powers, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Structure of International Security</italic>, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 34,35.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN4">
                    <sup>3</sup> Andreas Antoniades, Alister Miskimmon, Ben O&#x2019;Loughlin, &#x201c;Great Power Politics and Strategic Narrative&#x201d;, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Centre for Global Politics Economy, University of Sussex</italic>, March 2010, accessed on May 28, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264156520_Great_Power_Politics_and_Strategic_Narratives">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264156520_Great_Power_Politics_and_Strategic_Narratives</ext-link>
                </p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN5">
                    <sup>4</sup> ibid</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN6">
                    <sup>5</sup> Leo G. Perdue, Warren Carter, &#x201c;Chapter 4 - The Persian Empire and the Colony of Judah&#x201d; in, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Israel and Empire - A Postcolonial History of Israel and Early Judaism</italic>, ed. Coleman A. Baker (London : Bloomsbury T&amp;T Clark, 2015), p 109.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN7">
                    <sup>6</sup> Neville Morley, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Roman Empire, Roots of Imperialism</italic>, (London: Pluto Press, 2010), p 117.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN8">
                    <sup>7</sup> Alexis Heraclides, Ada Dialla, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent,</italic> (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), p 31.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN9">
                    <sup>8</sup> Knight Dunlap, "The Great Aryan Myth," 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Scientific Monthly</italic>, Vol 59, no. 4 (Oct 1944): p 296.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN10">
                    <sup>9</sup> Andreas Antoniades, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O&#x2019;Loughlin, &#x201c;Great Power Politics and Strategic Narrative&#x201d;, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Centre for Global Politics Economy, University of Sussex</italic>, accessed May 28, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264156520_Great_Power_Politics_and_Strategic_Narratives">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264156520_Great_Power_Politics_and_Strategic_Narratives</ext-link>.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN11">
                    <sup>10</sup> Ibid</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN12">
                    <sup>11</sup> Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, &#x201c;
                    <italic toggle="yes">Letters from an American Farmer (1782)</italic>&#x201d;, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines/literature-1991/authors/hector-st-john-de-crevecoeur.php">http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines/literature-1991/authors/hector-st-john-de-crevecoeur.php</ext-link> assessed on May 28, 2022.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN13">
                    <sup>12</sup> Nicholas J Cull, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The cold war and the United States Information Agency - American propaganda and public diplomacy, 1945&#x2013;1989</italic>, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 1.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN14">
                    <sup>13</sup> Officer of the Historian, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Development of Foreign Policy</italic>, accessed on May 28, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/development">https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/development</ext-link>.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN15">
                    <sup>14</sup> Edward J. Renehan Jr., 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Monroe Doctrine, The Cornerstone of American Foreign Policy,</italic> (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), p 9.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN16">
                    <sup>15</sup> Mark S Joy, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">American Expansion, 1783&#x2013;1860, A Manifest Destiny?,</italic> (New York: Routledge, 2003), p xxviii.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN17">
                    <sup>16</sup> The American Presidency Project, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Republican Party Platform</italic>, accessed on May 28, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1892">https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1892</ext-link>.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN18">
                    <sup>17</sup> A Scott Berg, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">World War I and America,</italic> (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), p, 3.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN19">
                    <sup>18</sup> Ibid.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN20">
                    <sup>19</sup> Ibid</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN21">
                    <sup>20</sup> The National WWII Museum, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Great Debate</italic>, accessed on May 29, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/great-debate">https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/great-debate</ext-link>.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN22">
                    <sup>21</sup> Britannica, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">World War II The Road to War</italic>, accessed on May 28, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/World-War-II">https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/World-War-II</ext-link>.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN23">
                    <sup>22</sup> Paul Kennedy, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000,</italic> (New York: Random House Press, 1987), p, 367.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN24">
                    <sup>23</sup> Nicholas J Cull, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The cold war and the United States Information Agency - American propaganda and public diplomacy, 1945&#x2013;1989</italic>, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 15</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN25">
                    <sup>24</sup> Ibid, 24</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN26">
                    <sup>25</sup> Ibid, 101</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN27">
                    <sup>26</sup> Ibid, 118</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN28">
                    <sup>27</sup> Steven Rosefielde, D Quinn Mills, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Masters of Illusion - American leadership in Middle Ages</italic>, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p 410</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN29">
                    <sup>28</sup> Nicholas J Cull, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The cold war and the United States Information Agency - American propaganda and public diplomacy, 1945&#x2013;1989</italic>, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 421</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN30">
                    <sup>29</sup> George H W Bush Presidential Library and Museum, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Public Papers Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the state of Union</italic>, accessed on May 29, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2656">https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2656</ext-link>
                </p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN31">
                    <sup>30</sup> Alister Miskimmon, Ben O&#x2019;Loughlin, Laura Roselle Carothers, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Strategic Narratives - Communication Power and the New World Order,</italic> (New York: Routledge, 2013), p, 30.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN32">
                    <sup>31</sup> Andreas Graham Allison, Nathalie Kiersznowski, Charlotte Fitzek, &#x201c;The Great Economic Rivalry: China Vs the US&#x201d;, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs</italic>, March 2022,</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN33">
                    <sup>32</sup> Antony J Blinkin, Secretary of State, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Speech at The George Washington University, Washington DC on the topic of The Administration's approach to the Peoples Republic of China on May 26, 2022</italic>, accessed on Oct 18, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">https://state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/</ext-link>
                </p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN34">
                    <sup>33</sup> Robert O'Brien, "5G and the Ideological Battle for Control of Global Technology Infrastructure," speech presented at the Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., May 15, 2020, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.state.gov/5g-and-the-ideological-battle-for-control-of-global-technology-infrastructure/">https://www.state.gov/5g-and-the-ideological-battle-for-control-of-global-technology-infrastructure/</ext-link>.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN35">
                    <sup>34</sup> Ibid</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN36">
                    <sup>35</sup> Ibid</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN37">
                    <sup>36</sup> Ibid</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN38">
                    <sup>37</sup> Thomas Carothers, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Aiding Democracy Abroad, A Learning Curve,</italic> (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1999), p, 3.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN39">
                    <sup>38</sup> Thomas Carothers, Benjamin Press, &#x201c;Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,&#x201d; 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 4, 2021,</italic> accessed on Oct 5, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/04/navigating-democracy-security-dilemma-in-u.s.-foreign-policy-lessons-from-egypt-india-and-turkey-pub-85701">https://www.carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/04/navigating-democracy-security-dilemma-in-u.s.-foreign-policy-lessons-from-egypt-india-and-turkey-pub-85701</ext-link>
                </p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN40">
                    <sup>39</sup> Diamond, Larry, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World,</italic> (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt &amp; Co., 2008), p, 338.</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN41">
                    <sup>40</sup> Nicholas J Cull, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The cold war and the United States Information Agency - American propaganda and public diplomacy, 1945&#x2013;1989</italic>, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 486</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN42">
                    <sup>41</sup> Ibid, 491</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN43">
                    <sup>42</sup> Ibid, 493</p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN44">
                    <sup>43</sup> Eric Posner, &#x201c;America&#x2019;s Return to Realism&#x201d; 
                    <italic toggle="yes">Project Syndicate &#x2013; The World&#x2019;s Opinion Page, September 3, 2021,</italic> accessed on Oct 5, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-return-to-foreign-policy-realism-by-eric-posner-2021-09">https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-return-to-foreign-policy-realism-by-eric-posner-2021-09</ext-link>
                </p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN45">
                    <sup>44</sup> Joe Biden, "Speech on the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan" (speech, Washington, DC, August 31, 2021), 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="http://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/us/politics/transcript-biden-speech-afghanistan.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/us/politics/transcript-biden-speech-afghanistan.html</ext-link>
                </p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN46">
                    <sup>45</sup> Eric Posner, &#x201c;America&#x2019;s Return to Realism&#x201d; Project Syndicate &#x2013; The World&#x2019;s Opinion Page, September 3, 2021, accessed on Oct 5, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-return-to-foreign-policy-realism-by-eric-posner-2021-09">https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-return-to-foreign-policy-realism-by-eric-posner-2021-09</ext-link>
                </p>
            </fn>
            <fn>
                <p id="FN47">
                    <sup>46</sup> Andreas Antoniades, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O'Loughlin, &#x201c;Great Power Politics and Strategic Narrative&#x201d;, 
                    <italic toggle="yes">The Centre for Global Politics Economy, University of Sussex</italic>, March 2010, accessed on May 28, 2022, 
                    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri"
                         xlink:href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264156520_Great_Power_Politics_and_Strategic_Narratives">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264156520_Great_Power_Politics_and_Strategic_Narratives</ext-link>.</p>
            </fn>
        </fn-group>
    </back>
    <sub-article article-type="reviewer-report" id="report28427">
        <front-stub>
            <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21956/routledgeopenres.19389.r28427</article-id>
            <title-group>
                <article-title>Reviewer response for version 1</article-title>
            </title-group>
            <contrib-group>
                <contrib contrib-type="author">
                    <name>
                        <surname>Ehrl</surname>
                        <given-names>Marco</given-names>
                    </name>
                    <xref ref-type="aff" rid="r28427a1">1</xref>
                    <role>Referee</role>
                    <uri content-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8467-2458</uri>
                </contrib>
                <aff id="r28427a1">
                    <label>1</label>Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown, Pennsylvania, USA</aff>
            </contrib-group>
            <author-notes>
                <fn fn-type="conflict">
                    <p>
                        <bold>Competing interests: </bold>No competing interests were disclosed.</p>
                </fn>
            </author-notes>
            <pub-date pub-type="epub">
                <day>14</day>
                <month>6</month>
            <year>2024</year>
            </pub-date>
            <permissions>
                <copyright-statement>Copyright: &#x00a9; 2024 Ehrl M</copyright-statement>
                <copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
                <license xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
                    <license-p>This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</license-p>
                </license>
            </permissions>
            <related-article ext-link-type="doi" id="relatedArticleReport28427"
                          related-article-type="peer-reviewed-article"
                          xlink:href="10.12688/routledgeopenres.18100.1"/>
            <custom-meta-group>
                <custom-meta>
                    <meta-name>recommendation</meta-name>
                    <meta-value>approve-with-reservations</meta-value>
                </custom-meta>
            </custom-meta-group>
        </front-stub>
        <body>
            <p>
                <bold>Summary: </bold>
            </p>
            <p> The essay attempts to trace and assess the strategic trajectory of America's foreign policy narratives. By focusing on inconsistencies in America's narratives across several key foreign policy developments in American history (e.g., Monroe Doctrine, Spanish-America War, World War I &amp; II, the Cold War, 9/11, &amp; the rise of China), the authors develop a critique of America's foreign policy, arguing that it is often driven by realism, rather than American idealism and liberal ideology. Specifically, the authors argue that America's foreign policy narrative was sometimes at odds with its aspirations to assume global leadership. Broadly informed by the idea of strategic narratives, this essay draws a general picture of how strategic narratives accompanied America's foreign policy decisions from the Monroe Doctrine to the present day. &#x00a0;</p>
            <p> </p>
            <p> Is the topic of the essay discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?</p>
            <p> </p>
            <p> While this essay sets out to develop an argument about inconsistencies within America's strategic foreign policy narrative, it could benefit from briefly discussing theoretical distinctions regarding strategic narratives. For example, Alister Miskimmon not only distinguishes between narrative formation, projection, and formation, but also between system, identity, and policy narratives (see Roselle, 2011 &amp; Miskimmon et al., 2017). The essay mostly focuses on narrative formation, however, it also speaks about narrative projection when discussing America's unipolar moment and its war against terror (p. 9). Narrative projection involves discussion of communicative strategies regarding target audiences, while narrative formation focuses mostly on processes of narrative creation (e.g., selection of ideological values and themes) and narrative tools (e.g., international broadcasting, cultural exchanges).</p>
            <p> Additionally, it would be helpful to understand what theoretical position the authors assume regarding the relationship between soft power and hard power as well as the role of strategic narrative actors. Sometimes it seems as if the authors suggest that specific hard power decisions and developments are reflective of changes and continuations in America's strategic narratives. This would also help to minimize "default interpretations" about how America's foreign policy decisions translate into strategic narratives. Finally, applying those concepts would help to specify the author's argument and contribution to the existing literature concerning strategic narratives.</p>
            <p> </p>
            <p> Does the essay contribute to the cultural, historical, and social understanding of the field?</p>
            <p> </p>
            <p> Miskimmon's strategic narrative framework accommodates approaches informed by rationalism, communicative action, reflexivity, or poststructuralism, it would be helpful to briefly specify the approach that the essay contributes to and why. As a minor suggestion, the idea of archetypal rhetoric is not sufficiently discussed to draw a comparison between America's foreign policy "success story" and America's "typical" foreign policy rhetoric. Put differently, developing a stronger rationale for why the concept of strategic narratives helps to highlight continuities and changes in America's foreign policy narratives would help the reader understand the contribution of the essay to the field of strategic narratives. Rather than discussing "typical" rhetorical highlights throughout America's foreign policy history, how does the concept of strategic narratives reveal new aspects in America's foreign policy narrative? Finally, in the conclusions, it would be helpful to briefly mention some of the limitations regarding the essay (e.g., selection of key events in America's foreign policy history, limitations of essays to draw conclusions about America's strategic foreign policy narratives, ontological approach/theoretical assumptions that guided the development of the essay).&#x00a0;</p>
            <p> </p>
            <p> </p>
            <p>Is the argument persuasive and supported by appropriate evidence?</p>
            <p>Yes</p>
            <p>Is the work clearly and cogently presented?</p>
            <p>Yes</p>
            <p>Is the topic of the essay discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?</p>
            <p>Partly</p>
            <p>Does the essay contribute to the cultural, historical, social understanding of the field?</p>
            <p>Partly</p>
            <p>Reviewer Expertise:</p>
            <p>International Crisis Narratives, Global Media, and Political Rhetoric.</p>
            <p>I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.</p>
        </body>
        <back>
            <ref-list>
                <title>References</title>
                <ref id="rep-ref-28427-1">
                    <label>1</label>
                    <mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
                        <person-group person-group-type="author"/>:
                        <article-title>Strategic Narratives and Alliances: The Cases of Intervention in Libya (2011) and Economic Sanctions against Russia (2014)</article-title>.
                        <source>
                            <italic>Politics and Governance</italic>
                        </source>.<year>2017</year>;<volume>5</volume>(<issue>3</issue>) :
                        <elocation-id>10.17645/pag.v5i3.1023</elocation-id>
                  <fpage>99</fpage>-<lpage>110</lpage>
                        <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17645/pag.v5i3.1023</pub-id>
                    </mixed-citation>
                </ref>
                <ref id="rep-ref-28427-2">
                    <label>2</label>
                    <mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
                        <person-group person-group-type="author"/>:
                        <article-title>Forging the World</article-title>.<year>2017</year>;
                        <elocation-id>10.3998/mpub.6504652</elocation-id>
                        <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.3998/mpub.6504652</pub-id>
                    </mixed-citation>
                </ref>
            </ref-list>
        </back>
    </sub-article>
    <sub-article article-type="reviewer-report" id="report28426">
        <front-stub>
            <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21956/routledgeopenres.19389.r28426</article-id>
            <title-group>
                <article-title>Reviewer response for version 1</article-title>
            </title-group>
            <contrib-group>
                <contrib contrib-type="author">
                    <name>
                        <surname>Mitic</surname>
                        <given-names>Aleksandar</given-names>
                    </name>
                    <xref ref-type="aff" rid="r28426a1">1</xref>
                    <role>Referee</role>
                    <uri content-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6918-7561</uri>
                </contrib>
                <aff id="r28426a1">
                    <label>1</label>Institut za me&#x0111;unarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, Serbia</aff>
            </contrib-group>
            <author-notes>
                <fn fn-type="conflict">
                    <p>
                        <bold>Competing interests: </bold>No competing interests were disclosed.</p>
                </fn>
            </author-notes>
            <pub-date pub-type="epub">
                <day>11</day>
                <month>6</month>
            <year>2024</year>
            </pub-date>
            <permissions>
                <copyright-statement>Copyright: &#x00a9; 2024 Mitic A</copyright-statement>
                <copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
                <license xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
                    <license-p>This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</license-p>
                </license>
            </permissions>
            <related-article ext-link-type="doi" id="relatedArticleReport28426"
                          related-article-type="peer-reviewed-article"
                          xlink:href="10.12688/routledgeopenres.18100.1"/>
            <custom-meta-group>
                <custom-meta>
                    <meta-name>recommendation</meta-name>
                    <meta-value>approve</meta-value>
                </custom-meta>
            </custom-meta-group>
        </front-stub>
        <body>
            <p>A comprehensive, largely historical, look at the strategic narrative of the United States. The authors use relevant literature to discuss the evolution of the narrative since the early 19th century, pointing at elements of continuity, but also adaptability. At times the article is too ambitious as it attempts to describe a large number of historical developments, which results in oversimplification of some of them (i.e. the description of World War II or post-Cold War events, such as the conflict in Yugoslavia). The conflict in Yugoslavia (in particular the NATO bombing in 1999 circumventing the UNSC) has led to the rise of Russian and Chinese counter-narratives on multipolarity. It is important to take notice of these counter-narratives, as they interact with the adaptation of the U.S. strategic narrative over the last quarter of the century. The article would also be strengthened by a closer look at some of the newer U.S. strategic communication programs (i.e. social media), as well as their role and implications for crises/conflicts such as the one in Ukraine since 2014. Nevertheless, the article is a balanced and worthy effort, showing the authors' thorough understanding of the fundamentals of strategic communication and strategic narratives.</p>
            <p>Is the argument persuasive and supported by appropriate evidence?</p>
            <p>Yes</p>
            <p>Is the work clearly and cogently presented?</p>
            <p>Yes</p>
            <p>Is the topic of the essay discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?</p>
            <p>Yes</p>
            <p>Does the essay contribute to the cultural, historical, social understanding of the field?</p>
            <p>Yes</p>
            <p>Reviewer Expertise:</p>
            <p>Strategic communication, strategic narratives, foreign policy, great power rivarly, Chinese foreign policy</p>
            <p>I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.</p>
        </body>
        <back>
            <ref-list>
                <title>References</title>
                <ref id="rep-ref-28426-1">
                    <label>1</label>
                    <mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
                        <person-group person-group-type="author"/>:
                        <article-title>From Globalisation &#x201c;Friend&#x201d; to Global &#x201c;Foe&#x201d;: The Evolution of the US Strategic Narrative on China&#x2019;s Rise</article-title>.
                        <source>
                            <italic>The Review of International Affairs</italic>
                        </source>.<year>2023</year>;<volume>74</volume>(<issue>1189</issue>) :
                        <elocation-id>10.18485/iipe_ria.2023.74.1189.2</elocation-id>
                  <fpage>31</fpage>-<lpage>56</lpage>
                        <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18485/iipe_ria.2023.74.1189.2</pub-id>
                    </mixed-citation>
                </ref>
            </ref-list>
        </back>
    </sub-article>
</article>